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Abstract
The Curry-Howard Correspondence has a long history, and still is a
topic of active research. Though there are extensive investigations into
the subject, there doesn’t seem to be a definitive formulation of this result
in the level of generality that it deserves. In the current work, we intro-
duce the formalism of p-institutions that could unify previous aproaches.
We restate the tradicional correspondence between typed λ-calculi and
propositional logics inside this formalism, and indicate possible directions
in which it could foster new and more structured generalizations.
Furthermore, we indicate part of a formalization of the subject in the
programming-language Idris, as a demonstration of how such theorem-
proving enviroments could serve mathematical research.
Keywords. Curry-Howard Correspondence, p-Institutions, Proof The-
ory.
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1 Some things to note
This work is the conclusion of two years of research, the first of them informal,
and the second regularly enrolled in the course MAT0148 Introduc¸a˜o ao Trabalho
Cient´ıfico. As a final product, it’s not a complete picture of the process that
gave its origin. During that time, many subjects were discussed that didn’t
make their way into this pages – be it for time, be it for a simple thematic
inadequacy. Some of these would-be-results are mentioned along the way, and
some have lost themselves to time or memory – maybe to br remembered later
on.
Our investigations had simple motivations: clarity. The Curry-Howard Cor-
respondence, our object of study, traces its origin to the early twentieth-century,
with the invention of the λ-calculus, and is an active research subject even to-
day. Being a correspondence between two logical systems, there is always the
pursuit, inherent to mathematical research, to extend its limits to more and
more general classes. There are also situations, such as in the foudational tome
Univalent Foundations Program [2013], in whose foundational theoretical and
methodological core is ingrained the Curry-Howard Correspondence. This idea
is also known as the paradigm of propositions-as-types.
It’s enough to say that the Curry-Howard Correspondence is as much inspir-
ing as it is mysterious. And it’s not for nothing that it doesn’t have an stablished
formalization. There are diverse formalisms and extensions built atop it, as the
Lambda Cube [see Barendregt, 1991], or the formalism of Lambek and Scott
[1988]. Each of them, however, has its compromises and imparsimonies1.
So we decided to carve a sliver into this problem ourselves, and seek our own
understanding of what is this result. And of course, what we found is a reflection
of our own methodological aproach – a personal expression. Nonetheless, we
oriented ourselves with the goal of distiling the essence of the problem.
1.1 What we are talking about
The Curry-Howard Correspondence is an observation on the relation between
two deductive systems: the intuitionistic propositional logic and the simply
typed lambda calculus.
The propositional logic is familiar to any mathematician. It’s the logic that
deals, evidently, with propositions – these formal objects that represent state-
1. Lambek, for example, restricts himself to some particular kinds of logics, while the
Lambda Cube is fundamentally limited as a mechanism for extending Curry-Howard, as it
deals only with subsystems of the Calculus of Inductive Constructions.
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ments and “it is raining and it is cold”, or “if it is raining them i’ll take my
umbrella”. They are representad symbolically by abstracting details off the
non-propositional parts with variables A, B, P , Q, etc.
From an algebraic point of view, such logics are algebras with operations
such as the conjunction, disjunction, implication, etc.
From a logical point of view, there are multiple formalisms for such systems,
but we’ll use the one in which proofs look like trees
$ A prop
A $ A true
$ A prop $ B prop
A $ B prop
A,B $ A true
A $ B Ñ A true
$ AÑ pB Ñ Aq true
The λ-calculus, on the other hand, has its origin in Computer Science, offer-
ing (in its untyped version) an alternative to Turing Machines.
The terms of the λ-calculus follow a specific syntax.
term “ V | pterm termq | λV term
which represent, respectively, variables, the application of functions, and the
construction of functions. For example, the constant function has the form
λxλy . x
which takes and argument x and returns a function that, upon taking any
other argument y, always returns x.
The crucial observation, here, is that we can make this theory more well-
behaved by attributing to this terms types – syntactical classes that dictate how
they should interact. We tart with a class of basic types denoted A, B, P , Q,
etc.
If we have two types A and B, we may construct the new type AÑ B, the
type of functions between A and B. Given a variable x of type A and a term t
(possibly containing x) of type B, we may form the term λx . t of type AÑ B.
If we have both f : A Ñ B and t : A (the colon is read as “has the type”), we
may form pftq : B.
You might already begin to see a relation between both systems. . . something
we might call a correspondence. Indeed, the Curry-Howard Correspondence is
an observation on some kind of interdeductibility bertween the Simply-Typed
λ-calculus and the Intuitionistic Propositional Logic. The rules presented above
can be seen as deduction rules, and, just like that, we see ourselves writing
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$ A type
x : A $ x : A
$ A type $ B type
x : A $ B type
x : A, y : B $ x : A
x : A $ λyx : B Ñ A
$ λxλyx : AÑ pB Ñ Aq
This can be very well summarized in a theorem, paraphrasing Sorensen and Urzyczyn
[2006],
Theorem. It is true that
1. If Γ $ t : A is deductible in the λ-calculus, then Γ˜ $ A true is deductible
in the Propositional Logic (where Γ˜ is Γ without variables).
2. If ∆ $ A true is deductible in the Propositional Logic, then Γ $ t : A is
deductible in the λ-calculus for some term t and Γ having Γ˜ “ ∆.
The details of this theorem are the subject of the present work.
1.2 Notes on methodology
Some methodological particularities are to be mentioned, to the cost of some
readers being spooked upon contact with the rest of the text. If you, the reader,
have skimmed the rest of these pages, no doubt you will have noticed the pres-
ence of code listings. That’s explained by two facts:
1. Our base theory is not ZFC, as much as it is not at all classic. We’re
working informally in the Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory, that is intuitionistic.
Every argument (though there are not many) are constructivist in nature,
and all definitions are focused in pinning down structure, not concepts.
2. Formally, our definitions and theorems are stated in the type-theory which
forms the basis of Idris. It is also derived from the Martin-Lo¨f Type The-
ory. There’s comprehensive material on that programming language on-
line, besides the book by Brady [2017]. Idris is a propgramming language,
focused on software development, but it serves just as well as a formal
theorem-proving enviroment.
Some statements come also in an Idris version – checked by its compiler –,
though we may have ommited some others in the name of brevity.
1.3 Take a map
This text is structured in the following way.
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• Section 2 talks about our formalism, and what is the reasoning behind its
definition. It seeks to answer the question, as the title indicates, what is
a logic? Particullarly, what is a formulation of the ideia of one logic that
is succeptible to the Curry-Howard Correspondence.
• Section 3 uses the formalism developed in 2 and applies it into formalizing
the theorem.
• Section 4 discusses possible further developments.
2 What is a logic?
2.1 As for the literature
The natural starting point for a definitional question like the one we ask (“what
is the Curry-Howard Correspondence?”) is bibliographic revision. We hoped to
find, among the miriad stablished definitions of what might a logic be, one that
fit our bill.
The study of logic – which, despite the wide-spread usage of the word, isn’t
a homogeneous field – is almost as old as western thought. Still, there doesn’t
seem to be any sort of consensus on its object of study. There isn’t a single
definition of the word “logic” [see Hofweber, 2018, 2].
Nonetheless, there are several definitions with varying levels of generality.
Starting with the concept of Tarski consequence operators [Los and Suszko,
1958], layed out as a way to define logics by their notions of deductibility, ab-
stracted away from the details of the particular deductions. They stand out for
being a “universal” formulation: a logic, so to speak, is determined by a set of
data (a set of formulas and an operator) satisfying certain properties (like fini-
tariety, monotonicity, reflexivity, etc) – not unlike the way many structures are
defined by their universal properties in Category Theory, only later for examples
to be constructed.
Another idea, more categoriacal in nature, and originated in other con-
texts, is that of institutions – or, for our proof-theoretical purposes, their
cousings the pi-institutions (the first occurence of the subject can be found in
Fiadeiro and Sernadas [1988]). A pi-institution is defined by a sequence of data:
1. A category Sig of signatures,
2. A functor Sen : Sig Ñ Set that, for each signature, constructs the set of
sentences over it, and
3. A notion CΣ of deductibility a` la´ Tarski for every signature Σ over the
sentences in Σ, such that
4. these data satisfy a coherence condition over the signature morphisms: for
f : ΣÑ Σ1, Γ Ď SenΣ, ϕ P SenΣ
Γ $Σ ϕ ùñ pSen fqrΓs $Σ1 pSen fqpϕq
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It’s worth noting that a pi-institution morphism is given by a functor
between the signature categories and a natural transformation between the sen-
tence functors (mediated by the morphism one), again satisfing some notion
of coherence. Coloquially, the functor provides a reinterpretation of conectives,
and the natural transformation a “change in the form” of the sentences.
These structures can be seen as a categorical reinterpretation of Tarski Op-
erators. Everything that applies to these applies point-wise to those, plus the
additional structure of the “translations” given by the signature morphisms. A
stardard reference on the subject of institutions, where one can get a better
understanding of the workings of this sort of machinery, is Diaconescu [2008].
There are even more categorical aproaches to general definitions of logics.
We could mention, for example, Lambek and Scott [1988]’s interpretation of
higher order logics as categories closed under certain operations. Particularly,
the idea that intuitionistic propositional logics correspond to cartesian-closed
categories – and that lambda-terms are arrows in that category.
Finally, the least standard reference we’ll considere comes from the famous2
n-categorical encyclopedia nLab [nLab authors, 2019]. A deductive system,
according to that definition, is “a collection of judgements” together with a
“collection of steps”, which consist in a list of judgements3– its hypothesis – and
another judgement – its conclusion.
.
J0, ¨ ¨ ¨ Jn´1
J
These “steps”, obviously, can be composed to form deductions. Actually,
deductions are freely generated from their composition.
In short, we consider the following definitions and interpretations:
Tarski The idea of logic as a “universal” formulation: an abstract structure
satisfying some properties.
Institutions Logics form a category with their translations.
Lambek Logics are categories themselves, or categories with additional struc-
ture.
Deductive systems Deduction from proof. A logical system is determined by
how you are allowed to construct arguments. A logical step is an abstract
entity that allows you to jump from hypothesis to a conclusion.
With the goal of defining a class of systems subject to a theorem like Curry-
Howard, we start exploring deductive systems. Let us keep in mind, though, that
eventually we’d like to formalize the theorem between the already mentioned
systems, with the possibility of extensions.
2. Maybe infamous.
3. For a more comprehensive discussion on judgements, see Martin-Lof [1996]
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2.1.1 Deductive Systems
The fundamental idea of deductive systems is that deductions are governed by
rules – objects that authorize transitions between judgements. These rules, or
steps, then, act over some kind of judgements J : Type. There are pairs, so
to speak, that indicate when a conclusion J : J can be made from hypothesis
J1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Jn´1 : J . Formally,
Definition 1 (Step/Inference). An inference over a base type J : Type is a
triple containing the indices of its hypothesis4, the hypothesis themselves, and
a conclusion.
idr/DeductiveSystems/DeductiveSystems.idr
14 record Inference j where
15 constructor MkInference
16 labels : Type
17 hypothesis : labels -> j
18 conclusion : j
A deductive system is determined not only from its judgements or logical
steps, but also by which steps ever are authorized. We call that extra structure
a ruleset.
Definition 2 (Ruleset). A ruleset is an indexed family of inferences.
idr/DeductiveSystems/DeductiveSystems.idr
26 Ruleset : Type -> Type -> Type
27 Ruleset l j = (l -> Inference j)
Now, we define what we actually want to achieve with deductive systems. In
a way, we have defined up to here the signature of a deductive system, but not
its deductions. So for every judgement, we attribute it the type of its proofs.
idr/DeductiveSystems/DeductiveSystems.idr
36 data Deduction : Ruleset l j -> j -> Type where
Constructing a proof, given a type for the judgements and a ruleset over it,
involves given a step (that’s in the ruleset) and proofs of its hypothesis. That
way, we obtain a proof of its conclusion.
That is, proofs are build inductively, or freely, from the application of the
following function.
4. Note our choice to use indexed families instead of a list, or a set. That offers, in general,
quality of life for the theory’s developer. Your are welcomed to try other formalisms in any
case of disagreement.
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idr/DeductiveSystems/DeductiveSystems.idr
46 Infer : {j : Type} -> -- Given a base type
J,ãÑ
47 {r : Ruleset l j} -> -- a ruleset R,
48 {i : l} -> -- and an inference
r,ãÑ
49 (h : labels (r i)) -> Deduction r (hypothesis (r i)
h) ->ãÑ
50 Deduction r (conclusion (r i)) -- we get a proof of
the conclusionãÑ
2.2 Relations
We may test definitions by comparing them to similar, better stablished ones.
As we work with deductive systems, inspired in an entry to a non-standard en-
cyclopedia, we might ask ourselfs: how does this compare to other formalisms
we’ve mentioned? Let’s start with Tarski operators – or their equivalent coun-
terparts, deductive relations.
Right off the bat we observe that deductive systems, thus abstractly defined,
is not a theory of inference, just as much as it is a theory of proofs – a proof-
theory. After all, we’ve defined a judgement’s type of proofs, with no space for
hypothesis. To this purpose, we may refine the type of judgements. Instead
of a generic type, we consider a type of hypothetical judgements over a base
type.
Definition 3 (Infereˆncia). A inference over a type of judgements J is an
object of the form
J0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Jn´1 $ J
where Ji, J : J . We denote the type of these objects as Inference J .
Definition 4. A hypothetical ruleset over a type J is a ruleset over Inference J .
It’s now evident the translation we seek: a hypothetical deductive system
determines a deductive relation, where we say that a certain inference is valid
under that relation if there’s proof of it. That is, we say Γ ą J if there’s proof
of Γ $ J5.
But alas, here we find a problem. On the one hand, the definition of an in-
ference construes its hypothesis as a finite list of judgements, which is usual and
sometimes necessary6in various type theories. On the other hand, deductive re-
lations are most commonly instituted between subsets of the type of judgements
5. We denote deductive relations by ą and hypothetical judgements by $, to avoid misun-
derstandings.
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and judgements themselves.
So how might we correct such disparity? We could hope to define translations
from one kind of judgement to the other. As the base type is the same, we’ve
only been left with transforming: literally changing the form of one kind of
judgement into the other. Here we might notice
Γ $ J ∆ ą J
that the relevant difference is just in the form of the hypothesis: finite lists
on the left, and subsets on the right. That’s the transformation we want to
achieve.
The seemingly most natural way to do it is to take the range of a list to
form a set, and to take finite lists from a set the other way around. That is,
denoting by “Γ $ J” the phrase “there’s proof ρ : DeductionR Γ $ J”,
Definition 5. The deductive relation ą$ determined by a deductive system $
is given by
∆ ą J if there is ∆-sequence Γ such that Γ $ J
Where a ∆-sequence is a finite list with its range a subset of ∆.
The deductive system $ą determined by a deductive relation ą is given by
Γ $ J if ImpΓq ą J
A keen reader might have noticed that these definitions seem to define some
kind of adjection between the classes of deductive systems and relations. Indeed,
Proposition 1. It is true that
Γ $ą$ J ðñ Γ $ J
∆ ą$ą J ùñ ∆ ą J if ą is finitary
∆ ą$ą J ðù ∆ ą J if ą is monotonic
A relation is finitary if from an inference we may find another that stands
between a finite subset of the original hypothesis and the same conclusion. A
system is monotonic if we may add hypothesis whilst preserving the inference.
Proof. Starting with the first one,
Γ $ą$ J ðñ ImΓ ą$ J
ðñ exists ImΓ-sequence Γ1 such that Γ1 $ J
6. In dependent type theories, contexts (hypothesis) must be ordered because later types
might depend on variables declared to be of earlier ones. Finiteness is a common property, as
we often construct proofs as necessarily finite objects.
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But Γ is a ImΓ-sequence and Γ $ J .
For the later two implications,
∆ ą$ą J ðñ exists ∆-sequence Γ such that Γ $ą J
ðñ exists ∆-sequence Γ such that ImΓ ą J
But the image of a ∆-sequence is exactly a finite subset of ∆. So we conclude
that
• If ą is finitary and ∆ ą J , we take finite ∆1 Ď ∆ such that ∆1 ą J . Any
enumeration Γ of ∆1 is such that
∆ “ ImΓ ą J
Γ $ą J
But Γ is a ∆-sequence.
• If ą is monotonic, and ∆ ą$ą J , then there exists a ∆-sequence Γ such
that Γ $ą J – i.e., ImΓ ą J . But ImΓ Ď ∆. So ∆ ą J .
We’ve stumbled upon a concept that’s reminicent of a morphism between
these two logical systems. But instead of exchanging signatures, as is normally
the case, we’ve transformed them – literally, changed their form.
That’s familiar enough: it’s analogous to a pi-institution morphism. Though
we’ve kept fixed a signature, the change-in-form behaves as some kind of natural
transformation between the “sentence functors” of the deductive systems and
relations.
A troubling inconsistency of this interpretation, however, is the fact that
deductive systems aren’t as “abstract” as deductive relations. We’ve defined
them explicitly, demanding data that informs us exactly how to construct proofs.
They talk about proof, not provability.
This can, however, be fixed.
2.2.1 p-institutions
We start our definitive formalization with the notion of a predicate, the “ab-
stract” version of a deductive system.
Definition 6 (Predicate). A predicate over a type is just an indexed family
over it. Under the propositions-as-types interpretation – which, besides being
formalized by us provides us with a foundational principle in our methodology
–, they may be understood as a function that associates to every element of a
base type a proposition – ergo, a predicate.
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In another, complimentary reading, a predicate pairs every inhabitant of
its universe of discourse with the type of its proofs. So that’s the proofful
interpretation.
idr/Predicates/Predicates.idr
19 Predicate : Type -> PointedFunctor TypeCat -> Type
20 Predicate a f = (mapObj (functor f) a) -> Type
We define also an appropriate notion of morphism between these objects:
Definition 7 (Predicate Morphism). A predicate morphism is a function
between base types that preserves provability.
In more detail, a morphism is a function that lifts to the type of proofs. i.e.,
given predicates pi : a Ñ U and τ : b Ñ U , a morphism is a function f : a Ñ b
such that, for every j : a, there’s a function εj : pipjq Ñ τpfpjqq.
idr/Predicates/Predicates.idr
33 record PredicateMorphism (a : Type)
34 (b : Type)
35 (f : PointedFunctor TypeCat)
36 (g : PointedFunctor TypeCat)
37 (p : Predicate a f)
38 (q : Predicate b g) where
39 constructor MkPredicateMorphism
40 Translate : a -> b
41 Transform : PointedNaturalTransformation TypeCat f g
42 Transport : {x : mapObj (functor f) a} -> p x -> q
(apply Transform Translate x)ãÑ
Definition 8 (p-Institutions). A p-institution is composed of a signature
category Sig, a functor Sen : Sig Ñ Type and a family of functions
pi :
ź
a:Sig
PredicatepSen aq
that respect a coherence condition
ź
a,b:Sig
ź
f :aÑb
ź
j:Sen a
pia j ÝÑ pib pSen fq j
Definition 9 (p-Institution Morphism). A p-institution morhpism between
pSig, Sen, piq and pSig1, Sen1, pi1q is determined by a functor F : Sig Ñ Sig1 and a
natural transformation µ : SenÑ Sen1 ˝F such that
ź
a:Sig
ź
j:Sen a
pi j ÝÑ pi1pµ jq
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2.2.2 Deductive systems as p-institutions
We’ve defined p-institutions in order to have an abstract notion of deductive
systems. A particular deductive system correspondes to a predicate, but a p-
institution is a structured collection of predicates. So, in order to see deductive
systems as p-institutions, we have to consider structure collections of them.
Particularly, a kind of indexed family.
We start with a category Sig and a functor Sen : Sig Ñ Type. But now,
instead of attributing a predicate to every signature, we attribute a ruleset.
For every Σ : Sig we attribute an indexing family lΣ : Type and a ruleset
RΣ : Ruleset lΣ pSenΣq. Besides, for every arrow f : ΣÑ Σ
1 a ruleset morphism
Rf : RΣ Ñ R
1
Σ.
Given the data pSig, Sen, l, Rq we may define the p-institution given by
pSig, Sen, piq
where
pi a J “ Deduction Ra J
as expected7.
3 What is the Curry-Howard Correspondence?
3.1 Propositional Logic
The tradicional Curry-Howard Theorem, as presented in Sorensen and Urzyczyn
[2006], is a specfic case on a distinguished result about a particular morphism
between two p-institutions. One of them, which we explore first, it that of the
so called propositional logics.
We start, as usual, with signatures.
Definition 10 (Propositional Signature). A propositional signature is de-
termined by an indexed family of arities, rules and a type for variables. That
is, a tuple pC,#,R,H,Vq where
• C : Type, is a type whose inhabitants are called connectives.
• # : C Ñ N, an arity function.
• For connective c : C, a family Hc “ thrur:Rpcq (where functionRCType)
of headers: lists containing the elements true or prop, whose lenght is the
connectives arity # c.
• A type V : Type for variables.
7. It’s interesting to consider that a pair pSig,Senqmight admit several notions of provability,
made concrete in the form of several rulesets over it. Considering as arrows between these pairs
functors and natural transformations as previously defined, could wi set up a pi or p-institution
of the “deductive structures over pSig, Senq? We leave you with that.
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idr/DeductiveSystems/PropositionalDeductiveSystems.idr
17 record Signature where
18 constructor MkSignature
19 connective : Type
20 arity : connective -> Nat
21 rule : connective -> Type
22 header : (c : connective) -> (rule c) -> Header (arity
c)ãÑ
23 var : Type
A signature, in the context of anything-institutions, can be understood as
the most concise data that distinguishes the different logics inside the same
institution-like structure. In the case of propositional logics, that means their
connectives, arities (which, by themselves, already determine all propositions)
besides the rules governing them (which determine the notion of proof).
Definition 11 (Propositional Signature Morphism). A propositional signa-
ture morphism is determined by a function between the connectives that
preserves arity and that’s lifted to a function between rules, besides a separate
function between variables.
That is, given signatures pC,#,R,H,Vq and pC1,#1,R1,H1,V 1q, a function
f : C Ñ C1 such that @c P C . # c “ #1 fpcq, and functions gc : Rpcq Ñ R
1pfpcqq
and h : V Ñ V 1.
Remark. The given definition for morphisms it, for the most part, too strict.
It is, however, simpler than the alternatives – and, for our purposes, it doesn’t
make any difference. We adopt it in the name of simplicity.
Definition 12 (Propositions over a signature). The propositions over a sig-
nature are build inductively:
• A variable is a proposition, and
• A connective with arity n applied to n propositions is a proposition.
idr/DeductiveSystems/PropositionalDeductiveSystems.idr
28 data Proposition : Signature -> Type where
29 Atomic : var s -> Proposition s
30 Apply : {s : Signature} ->
31 (c : connective s) ->
32 Vect (arity s c) (Proposition s) ->
33 Proposition s
But our logic’s judgements are not propositions: they are about propositions,
under certain hypothesis [see Martin-Lof, 1996].
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Definition 13 (Propositional Judgements). The propositional judgements
are of the form
P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Pn $ P adjective
where Pi and P are propositions and adjective is either true or prop.
idr/DeductiveSystems/PropositionalDeductiveSystems.idr
52 Judgement : Signature -> Type
53 Judgement s = (Context s, Lof (Proposition s))
The object to the right of $ is a atomic judgement.
idr/DeductiveSystems/PropositionalDeductiveSystems.idr
38 Lof : Type -> Type
39 Lof j = (j, LofAdjective)
The object to its left is a context – a finite list of propositions.
idr/DeductiveSystems/PropositionalDeductiveSystems.idr
46 Context : Signature -> Type
47 Context s = List (Proposition s)
Finally, we come to the rules.
The rules of propositional logic split into a handful of species: axioms and
structural, syntactical, introduction and elimination rules. Given a signature
Σ “ pC,#,R,H,Vq,
Axioms For every propositional variable p : V , postulate that
$ p prop
Varp
Structural For every context Γ, proposition P and judgement J , allow it to
be that
Γ $ P prop
Γ, P $ P true
Self
Γ $ P prop Γ $ J
Γ, P $ J
Weak
Syntactical Every connective c : C has a formation rule: given propositions
P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , P# c and context Γ,
Γ $ P0 prop ¨ ¨ ¨ Γ $ P# c prop
Γ $ cpP0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , P# cq prop
Formc
14
Introduction For every connective c : C and rule r : Rpcq, for propositions
P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , P# c and context Γ,
Γ $ P0Hcprqr0s ¨ ¨ ¨ Γ $ P# cHcprqr# cs
Γ $ cpP0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , P# cq true
Intro
r
c
Elimination For every connective c, an elimination rule
Γ $ cpP0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , P# cq
Γ, Pr11, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Pr1k1 $ C true ¨ ¨ ¨ Γ, Prl1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Prlkl $ C true
Γ $ Q
Elimc
for context Γ, propositions P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , P# c and proposition C. The propo-
sitions Pri are chosen among the Pj , where r varies over the rules and i
over r’s hypothesis that have the adjective true.
Let’s look at an example: suppose a signature has among its connectives a
_ : C, whose arity is #_ “ 2, whose rules are Left : R_ e Right : R_, and
headers
HcpLeftq “ rtrue, props
HcpRightq “ rprop, trues
So we have the following rules
Γ $ A prop Γ $ B prop
Γ $ A_B prop
Form_
Γ $ A true Γ $ B prop
Γ $ A_B true
Intro
Left
_
Γ $ A prop Γ $ B true
Γ $ A_B true
Intro
Right
_
Γ $ A_B true Γ, A $ C true Γ, B $ C true
Γ $ C true
Elim_
Note that despite not expressing it explicitly, we have specified the index
besides the rules themselves. The index of a rule consists on the name Formc,
Intro
r
c , etc, besides the data introduced as in “for every context Γ and propo-
sitions [. . .] ”. The rules themselves are given by their diagramatical representa-
tions.
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That said, we can take a look at a sample demonstration. We leave it as
an exercise to fill-in the names of the rules, complete the missing parts or even
redoing the proof-tree without looking at it.
$ B prop $ A prop
$ A_B prop
A_ B $ A_B true
$ A prop $ B prop
$ A_B prop $ A prop
A_ B $ A prop
A_B,A $ A true
r. . .s
A_ B $ B prop
r. . .s
A_ B $ A true
A_ B,B $ A true
A_B $ A true
A_ B $ B _A true
Note, finally, how the proof-tree has certain “transition” nodes between
judgements of type true and of type prop. When does that transition happen?
* * *
Formally, the rules’ indices form an inductive type, as follows (just the in-
troduction and elimination cases).
idr/DeductiveSystems/PropositionalDeductiveSystems.idr
61 data RuleName : Signature -> Type where
62 Intro : (c : connective s) ->
63 (r : rule s c) ->
64 (ctx : Context s) ->
65 Vect (arity s c) (Proposition s) ->
66 RuleName s
67 Elim : (c : connective s) ->
68 (ctx : Context s) ->
69 Vect (arity s c) (Proposition s) ->
70 Proposition s ->
71 RuleName s
The ruleset itself is an indexed famoly RuleName Σ, a function pairing
• The name Intro c r ctx ps to the rule
zip ps (header s c r)
Apply c ps true
• And the name Elim c ctx ps p to
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Left ()hkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkkkkkj
ctx $ Apply c ps true
Right rhkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkikkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkj
ctx ++ filterWith ps (rule s c r) IsIsTrue $ p
ctx $ p
The function filterWith takes from the vector ps those elements which
are paired with elements of the header rule s c r that satisfy the boolean
predicate IsIsTrue – those propositions that, for that header, need to be
true in the application of that rule –, e puts them together in a list that’s
appended to the context.
The previous example – the disjunction – would have an elimination rule as
in
ctx $ (Apply Or [p1, p2]) true
ctx ++ [p1] $ p true ctx ++ [p2] $ p true
ctx $ p true
3.2 λ-calculus
Signatures The signatures of the λ-calculus are identical to the propositional
logic’s ones, except for the addition of a single type for individual variables.
That is,
pC,#,R,H,Vty,Vtmq
The morphisms are extended in the obvious way.
Judgements The judgements of the λ-calculus over Σ “ pC,#,R,H,Vq are of
the form
v0 : P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , vn´1 : Pn´1 $ J
where vi : Vtm, Pi are propositions over Σ and J has one of the forms
P prop t : P
where P is a proposition and t is a term over Σ:
• Every individual variable is a term.
• For every connective c : C, and every rule r : R, there’s a term
constructor λrc that takes as many terms as there are hypothesis of
the form t : A; and returns a term.
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• For every connective c : C, there’s an eliminator εc that takes, for
every rule r : R, as many variables as there are hypothesis of the
form t : ϕ; and a term, and teruns a term. e.g.,
Γ $ a : A Γ $ B type
Γ $ λL_paq : A_B
Γ $ A type Γ $ b : B
Γ $ λR_pbq : A_B
ÞÝÑ
Γ $ p : A_B Γ, x : A $ ca : C Γ, y : B $ cb : C
Γ $ ε_pp, x, ca, y, cbq : C
In the example, the constructors are usually denoted
λL_paq ÞÝÑ InLpaq
λR_pbq ÞÝÑ InRpbq
εcpp, x, ca, y, cbq ÞÝÑ case p of InL x ÞÑ ca; InR y ÞÑ cb
Note that the instances of the symbols InL and InR in the eliminator
are simply asthetic – not really applications of the constructors.
Rules Axiom For every propositional variable p : Vty and context Γ, an axiom
Γ $ p type
VarpΓ, pq
Structural For every context Γ, variable x that does not occur in Γ,
proposition P and judgement J ,
Γ $ P type
Γ, x : P $ x : P
Self
λ Γ $ P type Γ $ J
Γ, x : P $ J
Weak
λ
Syntactical For every connective c : C, context Γ, proposition Pi, 0 ď
i ă # c,
Γ $ P0 type ¨ ¨ ¨ Γ $ Pn´1 type
Γ $ cpP0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Pn´1q type
Form
Introduction For every connective c : C and rule r : Rpcq, for proposi-
tions P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , P# c and as many terms ti as there are entries in r’s
header with the value true,
Γ $ J0 ¨ ¨ ¨Γ $ J# c
Γ $ λrcptq : cpP0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , P# cq
where Ji is Pi type if Hcprq “ type and ti : Pi if Hcprq “ true.
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Elimination For every connective c, an elimination rule
Γ $ p : cpP0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , P# cq Γ, xr11 : Pr11, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xr1k1 : Pr1k1 $ t1 : C
¨ ¨ ¨ Γ, xrl1 : Prl1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xr1k1 : Prlkl $ tl : C
Γ $ εcpxr11, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xr1k1 , t1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , tlq
still standing the same remarks as for the Propositional Logic elimi-
nators8.
3.3 The traditional correspondece, revisited
Having define both systems – the propositional logic pSigP, SenP, piPq and the λ-
calculus pSigλ, Senλ, piλq –, we strive to relate them. There’s an obvious way: a
“forgetful” morphism. The judgements in the λ-calculus carry more information,
in some sense, than those of Propositional Logic. We may, then, discard that
information.
We define a morphism TλÑP “ pT, α, βq between the p-institutions defined
from both parametrized deductive systems.
• The functor between signature-categories is a forgetful one.
T : pC,#,R,H,Vty,Vtmq ÞÝÑ pC,#,R,H,Vtyq
• The natural transformation, for its part, is given by the following rules:
for Σ : Sig, we define
αΣ : Sen
PΣÑ Senλ T pΣq
x0 : P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xn´1 : Pn´1 $ t : P ÞÝÑ P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Pn´1 $ P true
x0 : P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xn´1 : Pn´1 $ P type ÞÝÑ P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Pn´1 $ P prop
• The proof-translation β is given rule-by-ryle: for Σ : Sig and ϕ : SenP Σ,
βΣ,ϕ : pi
P
ΣϕÑ pi
λ
T pΣqβΣϕ
Writing J¨K for βΣ,ϕp¨q,
8. Yes, the syntax seems dense – because it is. These rules work much better in syntaxes as
that of Idris, in which the use of arbitrary functions substitues the conventions of mathematical
writing.
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JVarλpK “ Varp
JSelfλpDqK “ SelfpJDKq
JWeakλpD,D1qK “WeakpJDK, JD1K
JFormλc pD0, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,D# cqK “ FormpJD0K, ¨ ¨ ¨ , JD# cKq
JIntroλ,rc pD0, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,D# cqK “ IntropJD0K, ¨ ¨ ¨ , JD# cKq
JElimλc pD,Dr0 , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,DrlqK “ ElimpJDK, JDr0K, ¨ ¨ ¨ , JDrlKq
Inside our formalism, with all such preliminaries, the Curry-Howard Corre-
spondence takes its form as a short and elegant statement.
Theorem 1 (Powered-Up Curry-Howard). TλÑP is surjective in the space of
all proofs.
In details, given, in the propositional logic,
• a signature ΣP : Sig
P,
• a judgement JP : Sen
PΣP, and
• a proof ρP : pi
P
ΣJ ,
there exists, in the λ-calculus,
• a signature Σλ : Sigλ,
• a judgement Jλ : Sen
λ
Σ Σλ, and
• a proof ρλ : pi
λ
ΣJ ,
such that
• T pΣλq “ ΣP,
• αΣλpJλq “ JP e
• βΣλJλpρλq “ ρP
Proof. Take pΣ, J, ρ in the space-of-proofs in the prpositional logic, where Σ “
pC,#,R,H,V ,Nq and J “ P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Pn´1 $ P true{prop. There are four steps
for our demonstration: to build a signature, to build a judgement over that a
signature, to prove it and show that all that data hits our target under TλÑ prop.
The signature is rather trivial: just add to Σ a sufficient type for variables,
like N – i.e., pC,#,R,H,V ,Nq.
The new judgement is a bit trickier, but it’s nothing more than an extension
of the proof given by Sorensen and Urzyczyn [2006]. We construct, from the
proof ρ, a term t over distinct variables x0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xn´1
9.
9. In the demonstration, “it is convenient to choose Γ “ tpxϕ : ϕq | ϕ P ∆u, where xϕ are
distinct variables” [Sorensen and Urzyczyn, 2006, p. 78].
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x0 : P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xn´1 : Pn´1 $ t : P
or simply to consider
x0 : P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xn´1 : Pn´1 $ P type
depending on the adjective.
The term t is built by induction in ρ, together with the proof of its typing.
We omit the later for simplicity, as it’s just a matter of adding a superscript λ
to the proofs. Anyway, it must be the case that ρ is of one of the forms
Varp In this case, J , must be $ p type, in which case there’s nothing to con-
struct.
SelfpDq J must be Γ, J $ J , in which case we choose as a term the variable
that acompanies J .
WeakpD,D1q J is anything, with one additional hypothesis in the context. We
apply this translation recursively in the proof of the hypothesis that carries
J and use that result.
FormcpD0, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,D# cq J must be of the form Γ $ cp¨ ¨ ¨ q prop, in which case
there’s no term to build.
IntrorcpD0, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,D# cq J must be Γ $ CpPiq true, with hypothesis of the form
Γ $ Pi true or Γ $ Pi prop. To the ones that carry the adjective true,
we recursively apply this procedure and obtain terms ti, which we use to
build the term λrcpti.
ElimcpD,Dr0 , ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Drlq J must be of the form Γ $ C true with hypothesis
Γ $ cpPiq true and Γ, Prji $ C true, in which case we recursively apply this
procedure on the hypothesis and obtain terms cj (besides the variables
xrj i), and construct the term εpcj , xrjiq.
If we deonte by termpDq the term associated with the deduction D (if it
exists), and by deductionpDq the proof of its typing in the λ-calculus, the judge-
ments of the λ-calculus will be
x0 : P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xn´1 : Pn´1 $ termpρq : P
x0 : P0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , xn´1 : Pn´1 $ P type
with the associated proofs deductionpρq.
Finally, we obtain the triple pΣλ, Jλ, ρλq. Verifying that their image is what
it’s supposed to be is as simple as a matter of calculations – which , nonetheless
should be intuitive: as far as the signatures and judgements go, it’s evident; as
for the deductions, it’s as troublesome as observing that the translations works
rule-by-rule – and, afterall, we’ve defined ρλ so that it would work with that
translation.
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Sorensen and Urzyczyn [2006]’s result is then a corollary
Corollary 1 (Curry-Howard). Ipsis literis,
1. IF Γ $M : ϕ in λÑ, then rgpΓq $ ϕ in IPCpÑq.
2. If ∆ $ ϕ em IPCpÑq, then Γ $ M : ϕ in λÑ, for some M and some Γ
with rgpΓq “ ∆.
in our formalism: in the standard signature ΣP of the implicational proposi-
tional logic and Σλ of the λ-calculus,
1. If J : SenλΣλ has a proof, then αΣλpJq has a proof, and
2. If J : SenP ΣP has a proof, then there is J
1 : SenλΣλ that has a proof and
αΣλpJ
1q “ J .
Proof. If there is a proof of a judgement J in the λ-calculus in the tradional
signature Σλ, there is proof of αΣλ in the intuitionistic propositional logic, as
TλÑP is a morphism.
The other way, consider J a judgement of the intuitionistic propositional
logic in the standard signature ΣP, with a proof ρ : pi
P
ΣJ . Then there is a
judgement J 1 : Senλ Σλ and proof ρ
1 : piλΣλJ
1 with image J and ρ under TλÑP.
In particular, αΣλJ
1 “ J .
Finally, it’s worth noting the following: one particular troublesome point
about the Curry-Howard Correspondence was that, strangely, the literature
didn’t seem to agree if the theorem deserved the title of an isomorphism or not.
The title of Sorensen and Urzyczyn [2006]’s is Lectures on the Curry-Howard
Isomorphism, even though they themselves note that
[. . .] the reader may find [the theorem as stated] a little unsatisfac-
tory. If we talk about an “isomorphism” then perhaps the statement
of the proposition should have the form of an equivalence? The con-
cluding sentence [– that “in particular an implicational formula is
an intuitionistic theorem if and only if it is an inhabited type –]
is indeed of this form, but it only holds on a fairly high level: We
must abstract from the proofs and only ask about conclusions. (Or,
equivalently, we abstract from terms and only ask which types are
non-empty.) To support the idea of an “isomorphism,” we would
certainly prefer an exact, bijective correspondence between proofs
and terms.
Unfortunately, we cannot improve [the statement] in this respect,
at least not for free. While it is correct to say that lambda-terms are
essentially annotated proofs, the problem is that some proofs can be
annotated in more than one way. For instance, the proof
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p $ p
p $ pÑ p
$ pÑ pÑ p
can be annotated as either λxpλyp x or λxpλyp y. [Sorensen and Urzyczyn,
2006, § 4.3]
We may add that, further, even a single judgement of the λ-calculus may
have more than one proof.
r. . .s
x : A, y : A $ y : A
x : A $ λyy : AÑ A
$ λxλyy : AÑ pAÑ Aq
r. . .s
$ λyy : AÑ A
r. . .s
$ A type
x : A $ λyy : AÑ A
$ λxλyy : AÑ pAÑ Aq
IntroÑpIntroÑpr. . .s qq IntroÑpWeakpr. . .s qq
It’s up to the reader to complement the proofs and verify that the trees in
fact correspond to the written proofs.
What our perspective may offer is that the correspondence is, in fact, bi-
jective, but somehow only between the proofs in both systems. In the case of
judgements, multiple ones may hit a particular target.
4 Future developments
There are several subject we left behind, and gaps we’ve left to fill. Those can
be the object of further developments. We’ll discuss them briefly.
4.1 Polarity
As you will no doudbtly have noticed, developing all the details of this gener-
alized Curry-Howard Correspondence is a toilsome job. This, among others,
was the reason for us to ommit what would be a more complete formulation of
propositional logic.
You may have observed, if moved by obsessive curiosity about logical systems,
that our formalism does not admit the usual rules for implication.
Γ $ AÑ B true Γ $ A true
Γ $ B true
Γ, A $ B true
Γ $ AÑ B true
That’s because our propositional logic only admits positive connectives,
and the implication is a negative one. That’s what’s called the polarity of a
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connective, which defines if the connective is determined by its introduction or
elimination rules.
As we’ve defined them, connectives come with a list of introduction rules
and a single elimination rule calculated from the former. Negative connectives
work the other way around.
The non-linear conjunction notoriously admits both a positive and a negative
definition. The later is most familiar:
Γ $ A^B true
Γ $ A true
Γ $ A^B true
Γ $ B true
Γ $ A true Γ $ B true
Γ $ A^B true
in which the last rule is defined from the previous by the mantra “to deduce
the connective, it is necessary to provide everything that from it may be taken”.
The positive formulation, intead, is
Γ $ A true Γ $ B true
Γ $ A^B true
Γ $ A^B true Γ, A,B $ C true
Γ $ C true
where the second rule comes from the first by the mantra “to conclude
something from a connective, we must be able to prove it from every set of
hypothesis that might have been used to build it”10.
Extending the formalism to admit rules of negative polarity is not hard,
but it is laborious. We’d break the definition in two cases. For exemple, the
headers wouldn’t be simply a vector of adjectives, but indeed a such vector if
the connective is positive, and something else otherwise.
4.2 Universal formulation
Despite having formalized the Curry-Howard Correspondence, as was our goal,
we didn’t generalize satisfactorily. The step from a single signature to multiple
ones related by (unused) morphisms is only obvious. A more elegant formulation
would have to be more universal in flavor.
What would it look like? A candidate is to say that two p-institutions are
in “Curry-Howard correspondence” if there is a morphism between them that’s
bijective in the space of all proofs.
More analysis would be necessary, but right off the bat it seems too wak.
Certanly there must be such morphisms that would not deserve, somehow, the
name of Curry-Howard.
Another possible aproach is to algorithmically build the λ-calculus from the
propositional logic. That would hint us in what way to apply that procedure
to more general p-institutions – a sort of “Curry-Howardization”. That con-
struction would enojy many properties that, correctly abstracted, would give us
something that looks like a universal property.
10. It’s not a mantra that rolls out of your tongue, but it works.
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4.3 Other proof systems
Natural deduction is not alone as a manner of building proofs. Indeed, it is less
popular than others like Hilbert-style proofs or sequents.
All of this formalisms – we are to believe – form p-institutions if correctly
parametrized. If that’s the case, what kind of morphisms might be stablished be-
tween them? What do they tell us about the relation between those formalisms?
4.4 Other constructions
The language of p-institutions (paired with the powerful logic-building tool that
are deductive systems) are generic enough to be useful not only in exploring the
Curry-Howard Correspondence. There are several procedures logics are subject
to that might be analysed.
As an example, consider a tarskian relation ą over J . We define what’s
called it’s paraconsistetization ě. We call a set ∆ Ď J inconsistent if it can
deduce any judgement. The paraconsistentization
∆ ě J
stands if, and only if, some consistent11(not inconsistent) subset ∆1 Ď ∆ is
such that ∆1 ą J . What kind of p-institution construction would that look like?
What universal properties would it enjoy?
Furthermore, that’s not the only procedure we can come up with. We could
think of some sort of “universe addition”, like the ones in Martin-Lo¨f’s Type
Theory, or even something that could go by the name of the “complete interior”
of a logic according to a certain semantic.
The point is: a structural exploration of logics is a fruitfull endeavor; and a
categorical formulation – minimalist despite expressive – can be a lingua franca
in our incursions into this subject.
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